![]() ![]() By eschewing foreign suppliers, by investing in partnerships with domestic industry without fully funding its development efforts and by encouraging competition from multiple launch service providers, the Air Force shows it has learned from the decades-long arc of the EELV experience. These Rocket Propulsion System prototype agreements are just initial steps. The agreements require at least one third of the total cost of each prototype project be paid by other than the federal government. ![]() Early this year the service awarded a total of $242 million in contracts to Aerojet Rocketdyne, Orbital ATK, SpaceX and United Launch Alliance. off RD-180s and promoting competition in the government launch market. dependence on the RD-180.īeginning in 2015, as directed by Congress, the Air Force began creating a palette of technology options for weaning the U.S. That was the state of affairs when Russian geopolitical aggression, including annexing Crimea in 2014, uncorked long-suppressed concerns in Congress about U.S. That move left the Air Force with two rockets from a single U.S. The erstwhile competitors formed a join venture, United Launch Alliance, in 2006 to sell launch services. Instead, the EELV program encountered an anemic market, one that threatened the financial viability of Boeing and Lockheed Martin space-launch programs. Complicating matters, the envisioned robust commercial launch market had not materialized. failed to follow through on that requirement, setting the stage for today’s dependence on RD-180s. government agreed to allow Lockheed Martin to import the RD-180s, provided the engines were eventually manufactured in the U.S. To make it happen quickly, the Atlas 5 would need a powerful first stage, and the U.S. military and intelligence-community satellites. Success there would reduce the cost of launching satellites, including U.S. The Air Force invested $1 billion to encourage Boeing and Lockheed Martin to modernize, in the belief that these contractors would flourish and compete well in the competitive international commercial market. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin refined the Atlas 2 into the Atlas 5 fleet. Seeing predictions that the commercial launch market was about to boom, and to address Air Force requirements, McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) developed today’s medium and heavy-lift Delta 4 rockets from elements of the short-lived Delta 3 rocket. The Air Force in 1995 started the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, EELV, program after years of studies and false starts. space-launch industrial base and geopolitics. A key lesson from the RD-180 saga is this: While sound designs and performance are critical to success, other matters must also be considered when selecting launch suppliers, including the viability of a launch company’s business plan, the long-term health of the U.S. worrisomely dependent on Russia’s RD-180 rocket engines for national-security satellite launches should serve as a cautionary tale as the Pentagon attempts to end that reliance by awarding millions of dollars in contracts to American engine and rocket companies. became dependent on RD-180 engines from a strategic foe Freedom from Russian Rocket Engines By James Knauf | September 2016 ![]()
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